Duplicating authentication information between connections

ABSTRACT

A method includes authenticating, by a computing device, a first connection between one or more storage units and at least one of the computing device and a first user computing device. The method further includes determining, by the computing device, to add a second connection between the one or more storage units and at least one of the computing device and a second user computing device. The method further includes generating, by the computing device, a secret code and sending the secret code to the one or more storage units via the first connection. The method further includes sending, by the one or more storage units, responses to the secret code to the computing device via the second connection. The method further includes authenticating, by the computing device, the second connection based on the authentication of the first connection and the responses from the one or more storage units.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 120 as acontinuation-in-part of U.S. Utility application Ser. No. 15/255,748,entitled “SLICE REBUILDING IN A DISPERSED STORAGE NETWORK,” filed Sep.2, 2016, which claims priority pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 120 as acontinuation-in-part of U.S. Utility application Ser. No. 14/844,328,entitled “SECURELY STORING DATA IN A DISPERSED STORAGE NETWORK,” filedSep. 3, 2015, now issued as U.S. Pat. No. 9,747,160 on Aug. 29, 2017,which is a continuation of U.S. Utility application Ser. No. 13/944,277,entitled “SECURELY STORING DATA IN A DISPERSED STORAGE NETWORK,” filedJul. 17, 2013, issued as U.S. Pat. No. 9,154,298 on Oct. 6, 2015, whichclaims priority pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) to U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 61/696,018, entitled “AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO ADISTRIBUTED STORAGE AND TASK NETWORK,” filed Aug. 31, 2012, all of whichare hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entirety and madepart of the present U.S. Utility Patent Application for all purposes.

STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT

Not Applicable.

INCORPORATION-BY-REFERENCE OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED ON A COMPACT DISC

Not Applicable.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION Technical Field of the Invention

This invention relates generally to computer networks and moreparticularly to dispersing error encoded data.

Description of Related Art

Computing devices are known to communicate data, process data, and/orstore data. Such computing devices range from wireless smart phones,laptops, tablets, personal computers (PC), work stations, and video gamedevices, to data centers that support millions of web searches, stocktrades, or on-line purchases every day. In general, a computing deviceincludes a central processing unit (CPU), a memory system, userinput/output interfaces, peripheral device interfaces, and aninterconnecting bus structure.

As is further known, a computer may effectively extend its CPU by using“cloud computing” to perform one or more computing functions (e.g., aservice, an application, an algorithm, an arithmetic logic function,etc.) on behalf of the computer. Further, for large services,applications, and/or functions, cloud computing may be performed bymultiple cloud computing resources in a distributed manner to improvethe response time for completion of the service, application, and/orfunction. For example, Hadoop is an open source software framework thatsupports distributed applications enabling application execution bythousands of computers.

In addition to cloud computing, a computer may use “cloud storage” aspart of its memory system. As is known, cloud storage enables a user,via its computer, to store files, applications, etc. on an Internetstorage system. The Internet storage system may include a RAID(redundant array of independent disks) system and/or a dispersed storagesystem that uses an error correction scheme to encode data for storage.

It is further known that authenticating connections throughout adispersed storage system expends time and resources.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWING(S)

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a dispersed ordistributed storage network (DSN) in accordance with the presentinvention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a computing corein accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of an example of dispersed storageerror encoding of data in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram of a generic example of an errorencoding function in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a schematic block diagram of a specific example of an errorencoding function in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of an example of a slice name of anencoded data slice (EDS) in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 7 is a schematic block diagram of an example of dispersed storageerror decoding of data in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 8 is a schematic block diagram of a generic example of an errordecoding function in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of an example of authenticating aconnection within a dispersed storage network (DSN) in accordance withthe present invention;

FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of an example of using anauthenticated connection to verify a new connection in accordance withthe present invention;

FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram of another example of using anauthenticated connection to verify a new connection in accordance withthe present invention; and

FIG. 12 is a logic diagram of an example of using an authenticatedconnection to verify a new connection in accordance with the presentinvention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a dispersed, ordistributed, storage network (DSN) 10 that includes a plurality ofcomputing devices 12-16, a managing unit 18, an integrity processingunit 20, and a DSN memory 22. The components of the DSN 10 are coupledto a network 24, which may include one or more wireless and/or wirelined communication systems; one or more non-public intranet systemsand/or public internet systems; and/or one or more local area networks(LAN) and/or wide area networks (WAN).

The DSN memory 22 includes a plurality of storage units 36 that may belocated at geographically different sites (e.g., one in Chicago, one inMilwaukee, etc.), at a common site, or a combination thereof. Forexample, if the DSN memory 22 includes eight storage units 36, eachstorage unit is located at a different site. As another example, if theDSN memory 22 includes eight storage units 36, all eight storage unitsare located at the same site. As yet another example, if the DSN memory22 includes eight storage units 36, a first pair of storage units are ata first common site, a second pair of storage units are at a secondcommon site, a third pair of storage units are at a third common site,and a fourth pair of storage units are at a fourth common site. Notethat a DSN memory 22 may include more or less than eight storage units36. Further note that each storage unit 36 includes a computing core (asshown in FIG. 2, or components thereof) and a plurality of memorydevices for storing dispersed error encoded data.

Each of the computing devices 12-16, the managing unit 18, and theintegrity processing unit 20 include a computing core 26, which includesnetwork interfaces 30-33. Computing devices 12-16 may each be a portablecomputing device and/or a fixed computing device. A portable computingdevice may be a social networking device, a gaming device, a cell phone,a smart phone, a digital assistant, a digital music player, a digitalvideo player, a laptop computer, a handheld computer, a tablet, a videogame controller, and/or any other portable device that includes acomputing core. A fixed computing device may be a computer (PC), acomputer server, a cable set-top box, a satellite receiver, a televisionset, a printer, a fax machine, home entertainment equipment, a videogame console, and/or any type of home or office computing equipment.Note that each of the managing unit 18 and the integrity processing unit20 may be separate computing devices, may be a common computing device,and/or may be integrated into one or more of the computing devices 12-16and/or into one or more of the storage units 36.

Each interface 30, 32, and 33 includes software and hardware to supportone or more communication links via the network 24 indirectly and/ordirectly. For example, interface 30 supports a communication link (e.g.,wired, wireless, direct, via a LAN, via the network 24, etc.) betweencomputing devices 14 and 16. As another example, interface 32 supportscommunication links (e.g., a wired connection, a wireless connection, aLAN connection, and/or any other type of connection to/from the network24) between computing devices 12 & 16 and the DSN memory 22. As yetanother example, interface 33 supports a communication link for each ofthe managing unit 18 and the integrity processing unit 20 to the network24.

Computing devices 12 and 16 include a dispersed storage (DS) clientmodule 34, which enables the computing device to dispersed storage errorencode and decode data as subsequently described with reference to oneor more of FIGS. 3-8. In this example embodiment, computing device 16functions as a dispersed storage processing agent for computing device14. In this role, computing device 16 dispersed storage error encodesand decodes data on behalf of computing device 14. With the use ofdispersed storage error encoding and decoding, the DSN 10 is tolerant ofa significant number of storage unit failures (the number of failures isbased on parameters of the dispersed storage error encoding function)without loss of data and without the need for a redundant or backupcopies of the data. Further, the DSN 10 stores data for an indefiniteperiod of time without data loss and in a secure manner (e.g., thesystem is very resistant to unauthorized attempts at accessing thedata).

In operation, the managing unit 18 performs DS management services. Forexample, the managing unit 18 establishes distributed data storageparameters (e.g., vault creation, distributed storage parameters,security parameters, billing information, user profile information,etc.) for computing devices 12-14 individually or as part of a group ofuser devices. As a specific example, the managing unit 18 coordinatescreation of a vault (e.g., a virtual memory block associated with aportion of an overall namespace of the DSN) within the DSTN memory 22for a user device, a group of devices, or for public access andestablishes per vault dispersed storage (DS) error encoding parametersfor a vault. The managing unit 18 facilitates storage of DS errorencoding parameters for each vault by updating registry information ofthe DSN 10, where the registry information may be stored in the DSNmemory 22, a computing device 12-16, the managing unit 18, and/or theintegrity processing unit 20.

The DSN managing unit 18 creates and stores user profile information(e.g., an access control list (ACL)) in local memory and/or withinmemory of the DSN memory 22. The user profile information includesauthentication information, permissions, and/or the security parameters.The security parameters may include encryption/decryption scheme, one ormore encryption keys, key generation scheme, and/or dataencoding/decoding scheme.

The DSN managing unit 18 creates billing information for a particularuser, a user group, a vault access, public vault access, etc. Forinstance, the DSTN managing unit 18 tracks the number of times a useraccesses a non-public vault and/or public vaults, which can be used togenerate a per-access billing information. In another instance, the DSTNmanaging unit 18 tracks the amount of data stored and/or retrieved by auser device and/or a user group, which can be used to generate aper-data-amount billing information.

As another example, the managing unit 18 performs network operations,network administration, and/or network maintenance. Network operationsincludes authenticating user data allocation requests (e.g., read and/orwrite requests), managing creation of vaults, establishingauthentication credentials for user devices, adding/deleting components(e.g., user devices, storage units, and/or computing devices with a DSclient module 34) to/from the DSN 10, and/or establishing authenticationcredentials for the storage units 36. Network administration includesmonitoring devices and/or units for failures, maintaining vaultinformation, determining device and/or unit activation status,determining device and/or unit loading, and/or determining any othersystem level operation that affects the performance level of the DSN 10.Network maintenance includes facilitating replacing, upgrading,repairing, and/or expanding a device and/or unit of the DSN 10.

The integrity processing unit 20 performs rebuilding of ‘bad’ or missingencoded data slices. At a high level, the integrity processing unit 20performs rebuilding by periodically attempting to retrieve/list encodeddata slices, and/or slice names of the encoded data slices, from the DSNmemory 22. For retrieved encoded slices, they are checked for errors dueto data corruption, outdated version, etc. If a slice includes an error,it is flagged as a ‘bad’ slice. For encoded data slices that were notreceived and/or not listed, they are flagged as missing slices. Badand/or missing slices are subsequently rebuilt using other retrievedencoded data slices that are deemed to be good slices to produce rebuiltslices. The rebuilt slices are stored in the DSTN memory 22.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a computing core26 that includes a processing module 50, a memory controller 52, mainmemory 54, a video graphics processing unit 55, an input/output (IO)controller 56, a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) interface 58,an 10 interface module 60, at least one 10 device interface module 62, aread only memory (ROM) basic input output system (BIOS) 64, and one ormore memory interface modules. The one or more memory interfacemodule(s) includes one or more of a universal serial bus (USB) interfacemodule 66, a host bus adapter (HBA) interface module 68, a networkinterface module 70, a flash interface module 72, a hard drive interfacemodule 74, and a DSN interface module 76.

The DSN interface module 76 functions to mimic a conventional operatingsystem (OS) file system interface (e.g., network file system (NFS),flash file system (FFS), disk file system (DFS), file transfer protocol(FTP), web-based distributed authoring and versioning (WebDAV), etc.)and/or a block memory interface (e.g., small computer system interface(SCSI), internet small computer system interface (iSCSI), etc.). The DSNinterface module 76 and/or the network interface module 70 may functionas one or more of the interface 30-33 of FIG. 1. Note that the 10 deviceinterface module 62 and/or the memory interface modules 66-76 may becollectively or individually referred to as IO ports.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of an example of dispersed storageerror encoding of data. When a computing device 12 or 16 has data tostore it disperse storage error encodes the data in accordance with adispersed storage error encoding process based on dispersed storageerror encoding parameters. The dispersed storage error encodingparameters include an encoding function (e.g., information dispersalalgorithm, Reed-Solomon, Cauchy Reed-Solomon, systematic encoding,non-systematic encoding, on-line codes, etc.), a data segmentingprotocol (e.g., data segment size, fixed, variable, etc.), and per datasegment encoding values. The per data segment encoding values include atotal, or pillar width, number (T) of encoded data slices per encodingof a data segment i.e., in a set of encoded data slices); a decodethreshold number (D) of encoded data slices of a set of encoded dataslices that are needed to recover the data segment; a read thresholdnumber (R) of encoded data slices to indicate a number of encoded dataslices per set to be read from storage for decoding of the data segment;and/or a write threshold number (W) to indicate a number of encoded dataslices per set that must be accurately stored before the encoded datasegment is deemed to have been properly stored. The dispersed storageerror encoding parameters may further include slicing information (e.g.,the number of encoded data slices that will be created for each datasegment) and/or slice security information (e.g., per encoded data sliceencryption, compression, integrity checksum, etc.).

In the present example, Cauchy Reed-Solomon has been selected as theencoding function (a generic example is shown in FIG. 4 and a specificexample is shown in FIG. 5); the data segmenting protocol is to dividethe data object into fixed sized data segments; and the per data segmentencoding values include: a pillar width of 5, a decode threshold of 3, aread threshold of 4, and a write threshold of 4. In accordance with thedata segmenting protocol, the computing device 12 or 16 divides the data(e.g., a file (e.g., text, video, audio, etc.), a data object, or otherdata arrangement) into a plurality of fixed sized data segments (e.g., 1through Y of a fixed size in range of Kilo-bytes to Tera-bytes or more).The number of data segments created is dependent of the size of the dataand the data segmenting protocol.

The computing device 12 or 16 then disperse storage error encodes a datasegment using the selected encoding function (e.g., Cauchy Reed-Solomon)to produce a set of encoded data slices. FIG. 4 illustrates a genericCauchy Reed-Solomon encoding function, which includes an encoding matrix(EM), a data matrix (DM), and a coded matrix (CM). The size of theencoding matrix (EM) is dependent on the pillar width number (T) and thedecode threshold number (D) of selected per data segment encodingvalues. To produce the data matrix (DM), the data segment is dividedinto a plurality of data blocks and the data blocks are arranged into Dnumber of rows with Z data blocks per row. Note that Z is a function ofthe number of data blocks created from the data segment and the decodethreshold number (D). The coded matrix is produced by matrix multiplyingthe data matrix by the encoding matrix.

FIG. 5 illustrates a specific example of Cauchy Reed-Solomon encodingwith a pillar number (T) of five and decode threshold number of three.In this example, a first data segment is divided into twelve data blocks(D1-D12). The coded matrix includes five rows of coded data blocks,where the first row of X11-X14 corresponds to a first encoded data slice(EDS 1_1), the second row of X21-X24 corresponds to a second encodeddata slice (EDS 2_1), the third row of X31-X34 corresponds to a thirdencoded data slice (EDS 3_1), the fourth row of X41-X44 corresponds to afourth encoded data slice (EDS 4_1), and the fifth row of X51-X54corresponds to a fifth encoded data slice (EDS 5_1). Note that thesecond number of the EDS designation corresponds to the data segmentnumber.

Returning to the discussion of FIG. 3, the computing device also createsa slice name (SN) for each encoded data slice (EDS) in the set ofencoded data slices. A typical format for a slice name 60 is shown inFIG. 6. As shown, the slice name (SN) 60 includes a pillar number of theencoded data slice (e.g., one of 1-T), a data segment number (e.g., oneof 1-Y), a vault identifier (ID), a data object identifier (ID), and mayfurther include revision level information of the encoded data slices.The slice name functions as, at least part of, a DSN address for theencoded data slice for storage and retrieval from the DSN memory 22.

As a result of encoding, the computing device 12 or 16 produces aplurality of sets of encoded data slices, which are provided with theirrespective slice names to the storage units for storage. As shown, thefirst set of encoded data slices includes EDS 1_1 through EDS 5_1 andthe first set of slice names includes SN 1_1 through SN 5_1 and the lastset of encoded data slices includes EDS 1_Y through EDS 5_Y and the lastset of slice names includes SN 1_Y through SN 5_Y.

FIG. 7 is a schematic block diagram of an example of dispersed storageerror decoding of a data object that was dispersed storage error encodedand stored in the example of FIG. 4. In this example, the computingdevice 12 or 16 retrieves from the storage units at least the decodethreshold number of encoded data slices per data segment. As a specificexample, the computing device retrieves a read threshold number ofencoded data slices.

To recover a data segment from a decode threshold number of encoded dataslices, the computing device uses a decoding function as shown in FIG.8. As shown, the decoding function is essentially an inverse of theencoding function of FIG. 4. The coded matrix includes a decodethreshold number of rows (e.g., three in this example) and the decodingmatrix in an inversion of the encoding matrix that includes thecorresponding rows of the coded matrix. For example, if the coded matrixincludes rows 1, 2, and 4, the encoding matrix is reduced to rows 1, 2,and 4, and then inverted to produce the decoding matrix.

FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of an example of authenticating aconnection within a dispersed storage network (DSN). FIG. 9 includesuser computing device 1, DS client module 34 (e.g., a separate DS clientmodule, or a DS client module integrated into a computing device of theDSN), and one or more storage units of a set of storage units 36 (SUs1-5). SUs 1-5 include at least a threshold number of storage units. Thethreshold number is a read threshold number, a write threshold number, adecode threshold number, or a pillar width threshold number. DS module34 is operable to authenticate a connection (e.g., connection 1) betweenSUs 1-5 and at least one of user computing device 1 and DS client module34. To authenticate connection 1, a connection between user computingdevice 1 and the DS client module 34 (e.g., first part of connection 1)is authenticated. To authenticate the first part of connection 1, the DSclient module 34 obtains a public key (e.g., a public key of a publickey infrastructure (PKI)) associated with user computing device 1. Forexample, DS client module 34 obtains public key 1_1.

The DS client module 34 encrypts a message regarding establishing aconnection between user computing device 1 using public key 1_1. The DSclient module 34 sends the encrypted message (e.g., encrypted message1_1) to user computing device 1. User computing device 1 decryptsencrypted message 1_1 using private key 1_1 (e.g., a private key of thepublic key infrastructure (PKI)) and sends response 1_1 to the DS clientmodule 34. The DS client module 34 authenticates the first part ofconnection 1 when response 1_1 includes an anticipated message reply.For example, the anticipated message reply includes informationacknowledging the correct contents of the message.

To continue with the authentication of connection 1, a connectionbetween SUs 1-5 and DS client module 34 (e.g., second part of connection1) is authenticated. To authenticate the second part of connection 1,the DS client module 34 obtains a public key for each storage unit ofSUs 1-5 (e.g., public keys 2-6). The DS client module 34 encryptsmessages using each of public keys 2-6 where each message is regardingestablishing the second part of the first connection between aparticular storage unit of SUs 1-5 and DS client module 34. For example,DS client module 34 encrypts a message regarding establishing aconnection between SU 1 and DS client module 34 using public key 2 tocreate encrypted message 2. This process continues for each of SUs 2-5to produce encrypted messages 3-6. The DS client module 34 sends eachencrypted message 2-6 to each corresponding storage unit of SUs 1-5.

SUs 1-5 receive encrypted messages 2-6 and decrypt encrypted messages2-6 using a corresponding private key (e.g., a private key of the publickey infrastructure (PKI)). For example, SU 1 decrypts encrypted message2 using private key 2. In response to the decrypted messages, SUs 1-5send responses 2-6 to DS client module 34. For example, SU 1 sendsresponse 2 in response to decrypting encrypted message 2, SU 2 sendsresponse 3 in response to decrypting encrypted message 3, SU 3 sendsresponse 4 in response to decrypting encrypted message 4, SU 4 sendsresponse 5 in response to decrypting encrypted message 5, and SU 5 sendsresponse 6 in response to decrypting encrypted message 6. DS clientmodule 34 authenticates the second part of connection 1 when eachresponse of responses 1-6 includes an anticipated message reply.

Alternatively, or additionally, a username and password authenticationprocess is implemented to authenticate the first and second parts ofconnection 1. Alternatively, or additionally, an authority agent isimplemented to authenticate connection 1 as well as individually verifyuser computing device 1 and the DS client module 34, and verify thatuser computing device 1 and the DS client module 34 are allowed tocommunicate.

FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of an example of using anauthenticated connection to verify a new connection. FIG. 10 includesuser computing device 1, user computing device 2, DS client module 34(e.g., a separate DS client module, or a DS client module integrated ina computing device), and one or more storage units of a set of storageunits 36 (SUs 1-5). As discussed in FIG. 9, connection 1 isauthenticated. The DS client module 34 determines to add a secondconnection (e.g., connection 2) between SUs 1-5 and at least one of theDS client module 34 and user computing device 2. Instead of repeatingthe entire process described in FIG. 9, DS client module 34 generatessecret code 82.

For example, the DS client module 34 generates secret code 82 using oneor more of a Diffie-Hellman approach, random generation, a lookup, andretrieval from memory. As an example of generating the secret code 82using the Diffie-Hellman approach, the DS client module 34 generatespublic values p and g, generates a value A based on public values p andg, and generates the secret code to include public values p and g, andA. The public value g is a primitive root for public value p such thatfor every number a between 1 and (p−1), there is some integer exponent(e) such that g{circumflex over ( )}e mod p=a. The DS client module 34generates value A based on an expression of: A=g^(a) mod p, where valuea is a private value associated with the DS client module 34 (e.g.,retrieved from memory, generated random number, retrieved from alookup).

The DS client module 34 sends secret code 82 to SUs 1-5 via connection1. SUs 1-5 receive secret code 82 and send responses to the secret code84 via connection 2. The responses to the secret code 84 include one ormore of the secret code 82 and information used to establish the secretcode 82. For example, when the secret code 82 is generated using theDiffie-Hellman approach, SUs 1-5 extract public values p and g and valueA from the secret code 82. SUs 1-5 generate a private value b (e.g.,retrieved from memory, generated random number, retrieved from alookup). SUs 1-5 generate a value B in accordance with an expression ofB=g^(b) mod p. SUs 1-5 generate the responses to the secret code 84 toinclude the value B and output the responses to the secret code 84 tothe DS client module 34.

The DS client module 34 interprets the responses to the secret code 84from SUs 1-5 to determine whether the responses to the secret code 84include an anticipated secret code reply. When the responses 84 includethe anticipated secret code reply, the DS client module 34 relies on theauthentication of connection 1 to authenticate connection 2 between DSclient module 34 and SUs 1-5. For example, when the Diffie-Hellmanapproach is used, the value B is the anticipated secret code reply wherethe secret code=B^(a) mod p. If the value B is correct, the DS clientmodule 34 relies on the authentication of connection 1 to authenticateconnection 2 between the DS client module 34 and SUs 1-5 (e.g., thesecond part of connection 2).

To authenticate the first part of connection 2 (e.g., the connectionbetween user computing device 2 and DS client module 34), the DS clientmodule 34 obtains a public key (e.g., a public key of a public keyinfrastructure (PKI)) associated with user computing device 2 (e.g.,public key 2_1). The DS client module 34 encrypts a message (e.g.,encrypted message 2_1) regarding establishing the first part ofconnection 2 between user computing device 2 and the DS client module 34using public key 2_1. DS client module 34 sends encrypted message 2_1 touser computing device 2. User computing device 2 decrypts encryptedmessage 2_1 using private key 2_1 (e.g., a private key of a public keyinfrastructure (PKI)) and sends response 2_1 to the message to the DSclient module 34. The DS client module 34 authenticates the first partof connection 2 when response 2_1 to the message includes an anticipatedmessage reply.

Alternatively, or additionally, a username and password authenticationprocess is implemented to authenticate the first part of connection 2.Alternatively, or additionally, an authority agent is implemented toauthenticate connection 2 as well as individually verify user computingdevice 2 and the DS client module 34, and verify that user computingdevice 2 and the DS client module 34 are allowed to communicate.

FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram of another example of using anauthenticated connection to verify a new connection. FIG. 11 includesuser computing device 1, user computing device 2, user computing device3, DS client module 34 (e.g., a separate DS client module, or a DSclient module included in a computing device), and one or more storageunits of a set of storage units 36 (SUs 1-5). As discussed in FIG. 9,connection 1 is authenticated and as discussed in FIG. 10, connection 2is authenticated based on connection 1's authentication. The DS clientmodule 34 determines to add a third connection (e.g., connection 3)between SUs 1-5 and at least one of the DS client module 34 and usercomputing device 3.

DS client module 34 generates a secret code 82 (e.g., the same secretcode used to authenticate connection 2 or a different secret code). Forexample, the DS client module 34 generates the secret code 82 using oneor more of a Diffie-Hellman approach, random generation, a lookup, andretrieval from memory. The DS client module 34 sends the secret code 82to SUs 1-5 via connections 1 or 2. Here, the DS client module 34 sendsthe secret code 82 to SUs 1-5 via connection 2. SUs 1-5 receive thesecret code and send responses to the secret code 84 via connection 3.The responses to the secret code 84 include one or more of the secretcode 82 and information used to establish the secret code 82.

The DS client module 34 interprets the responses 84 from SUs 1-5 todetermine whether the responses 84 include an anticipated secret codereply. When the responses 84 include the anticipated secret code reply,the DS client module 34 relies on the authentication of connection 2 toauthenticate connection 3 between the DS client module 34 and SUs 1-5.

To authenticate the first part of connection 3 (e.g., the connectionbetween user computing device 3 and DS client module 34), DS clientmodule 34 obtains a public key (e.g., a public key of a public keyinfrastructure (PKI)) associated with user computing device 3 (e.g.,public key 3_1). The DS client module 34 encrypts a message (e.g.,encrypted message 3_1) regarding establishing the first part ofconnection 3 between user computing device 3 and the DS client module 34using public key 3_1. The DS client module 34 sends encrypted message3_1 to user computing device 3. User computing device 3 decryptsencrypted message 3_1 using private key 3_1 (e.g., a private key of apublic key infrastructure (PKI)) and sends response 3_1 to the messageto the DS client module 34. The DS client module 34 authenticates thefirst part of connection 3 when response 3_1 to the message includes ananticipated message reply.

Alternatively, or in additionally, a username and passwordauthentication process is implemented to authenticate the first part ofconnection 3. Alternatively, or additionally, an authority agent isimplemented to authenticate connection 3 as well as individually verifyuser computing device 1 and the DS client module 34, and verify thatuser computing device 3 and the DS client module 34 are allowed tocommunicate.

FIG. 12 is a logic diagram of an example of using an authenticatedconnection to verify a new connection. The method begins with step 86where a computing device (e.g. a DS client module 34) of a dispersedstorage network (DSN) authenticates a first connection between one ormore storage units (SUs) of a set of storage units of the DSN and atleast one of the computing device and a first user computing device ofthe DSN.

The one or more storage units include at least a threshold number ofstorage units, where the threshold number is a read threshold number, awrite threshold number, a decode threshold number, or a pillar widththreshold number. To authenticate the first connection between firstuser computing device and the one or more storage units, a first part ofthe first connection between the first user computing device and thecomputing device is authenticated.

To authenticate the first part of the first connection between the firstuser computing device and the computing device, the computing deviceobtains a public key (e.g., a public key of a public key infrastructure(PKI)) associated with the first user computing device. The computingdevice encrypts a message regarding establishing the first part of thefirst connection between the first user computing device and thecomputing device using the public key. The computing device sends theencrypted message to the first user computing device. The first usercomputing device decrypts the encrypted message using a private key(e.g., a private key of a public key infrastructure (PKI)) and sends aresponse to the message to the computing device. The computing deviceauthenticates the first part of the first connection with the firstcomputing device when the response to the message includes ananticipated message reply.

To authenticate a second part of the first connection between thecomputing device and the one or more storage units, the computing deviceobtains one or more public keys associated with the one or more storageunits where each public key of the one or more public keys is associatedwith a particular storage unit of the one or more storage units. Thecomputing device encrypts each of one or more messages using aparticular public key of the one or more public keys where each of theone or more messages is regarding establishing the second part of thefirst connection between the particular storage unit and the computingdevice. The computing device sends each of the one or more encryptedmessages to each corresponding storage unit of the one or more storageunits. Each storage unit of the one or more storage units decrypts acorresponding encrypted message using a corresponding private key. Theone or more storage units send one or more responses to the computingdevice. The computing device authenticates the second part of the firstconnection between the computing device and the one or more storageunits when each response of the one or more responses include ananticipated message reply.

Alternatively, or additionally, a username and password authenticationprocess is implemented to authenticate the first and/or second parts ofthe first connection. Alternatively, or additionally, an authority agentmay be implemented to authenticate the first connection as well asindividually verify the first user computing device and the computingdevice, and verify that first user computing device and the computingdevice are allowed to communicate.

The method continues with step 88 where the computing device determinesto add a second connection between the one or more storage units and atleast one of the computing device and a second user computing device.The method continues with step 90 where the computing device generates asecret code. For example, the computing device generates the secret codeusing one or more of a Diffie-Hellman approach, random generation, alookup, and retrieval from memory. As an example of generating thesecret code using the Diffie-Hellman approach, the computing devicegenerates public values p and g, generates a value A based on publicvalues p and g, and generates the secret code to include public values pand g, and A. The public value g is a primitive root for public value psuch that for every number a between 1 and (p−1), there is some integerexponent (e) such that g{circumflex over ( )}e mod p=a. The computingdevice generates value A based on an expression of: A=g^(a) mod p, wherevalue a is a private value associated with the DS client module 34(e.g., retrieved from memory, generated random number, retrieved from alookup).

The method continues with step 92 where the computing device sends thesecret code to the one or more storage units via the first connection.The method continues with step 94 where the one or more storage unitssend responses to the secret code to the computing device via the secondconnection. The responses to the secret code include one or more of thesecret code and information used to establish the secret code. Forexample, when the secret code is generated using the Diffie-Hellmanapproach, the one or more storage units receive the secret code andextract public values p and g and value A. The one or more storage unitsgenerate a private value b (e.g., retrieved from memory, generatedrandom number, retrieved from a lookup). The one or more storage unitsgenerate a value B in accordance with an expression of B=g^(b) mod p.The one or more storage units generate the responses to the secret codeto include the value B and output the responses to secret code to thecomputing device.

The method continues with step 96 where the computing deviceauthenticates the second connection based on the authentication of thefirst connection and the responses from the one or more storage units.For example, the computing device interprets the responses from the oneor more storage units to determine whether the responses include ananticipated secret code reply. When the responses include theanticipated secret code reply, the computing device relies on theauthentication of first connection to authenticate the second connectionbetween the computing device and the one or more storage units. Forexample, when the Diffie-Hellman approach is used, the value B is theanticipated secret code reply where the secret code=W mod p. If thevalue B is correct, the computing device relies on the authentication ofthe first connection to authenticate the second connection between thecomputing device and the one or more storage units.

To authenticate a first part of the second connection between the seconduser computing device and the computing device, the computing deviceobtains a public key (e.g., a public key of a public key infrastructure(PKI)) associated with the second user computing device. The computingdevice encrypts a message regarding establishing the first part of thesecond connection between the second user computing device and thecomputing device using the public key and sends the encrypted message tothe second user computing device. The second user computing devicedecrypts the encrypted message using a private key (e.g., a private keyof a public key infrastructure (PKI)) and sends a response to themessage to the computing device. The computing device authenticates thefirst part of the second connection between the second computing deviceand the computing device when the response to the message includes ananticipated message reply.

Alternatively, or additionally, a username and password authenticationprocess is implemented to authenticate the first part of the secondconnection between the second user computing device and the computingdevice. Alternatively, or additionally, an authority agent may beimplemented to authenticate the second connection between the seconduser computing device and the computing device as well as individuallyverify the second user computing device and the computing device, andverify that second user computing device and the computing device areallowed to communicate.

The computing device may further determine to add a third connectionbetween the one or more storage units and at least one of the computingdevice and a third user computing device. The computing device generatesa second secret code (e.g., the same secret code used to authenticatethe second connection or a new secret code). The computing device sendsthe second secret code to the one or more storage units via the firstconnection or the second connection. The one or more storage units sendresponses to the second secret code to the computing device via thethird connection. The computing device authenticates the thirdconnection based on the authentication of the first connection or thesecond connection (i.e., authentication of the connection used to sendthe secret code) and the responses to the second secret code from theone or more storage units.

It is noted that terminologies as may be used herein such as bit stream,stream, signal sequence, etc. (or their equivalents) have been usedinterchangeably to describe digital information whose contentcorresponds to any of a number of desired types (e.g., data, video,speech, audio, etc. any of which may generally be referred to as‘data’).

As may be used herein, the terms “substantially” and “approximately”provides an industry-accepted tolerance for its corresponding termand/or relativity between items. Such an industry-accepted toleranceranges from less than one percent to fifty percent and corresponds to,but is not limited to, component values, integrated circuit processvariations, temperature variations, rise and fall times, and/or thermalnoise. Such relativity between items ranges from a difference of a fewpercent to magnitude differences. As may also be used herein, theterm(s) “configured to”, “operably coupled to”, “coupled to”, and/or“coupling” includes direct coupling between items and/or indirectcoupling between items via an intervening item (e.g., an item includes,but is not limited to, a component, an element, a circuit, and/or amodule) where, for an example of indirect coupling, the intervening itemdoes not modify the information of a signal but may adjust its currentlevel, voltage level, and/or power level. As may further be used herein,inferred coupling (i.e., where one element is coupled to another elementby inference) includes direct and indirect coupling between two items inthe same manner as “coupled to”. As may even further be used herein, theterm “configured to”, “operable to”, “coupled to”, or “operably coupledto” indicates that an item includes one or more of power connections,input(s), output(s), etc., to perform, when activated, one or more itscorresponding functions and may further include inferred coupling to oneor more other items. As may still further be used herein, the term“associated with”, includes direct and/or indirect coupling of separateitems and/or one item being embedded within another item.

As may be used herein, the term “compares favorably”, indicates that acomparison between two or more items, signals, etc., provides a desiredrelationship. For example, when the desired relationship is that signal1 has a greater magnitude than signal 2, a favorable comparison may beachieved when the magnitude of signal 1 is greater than that of signal 2or when the magnitude of signal 2 is less than that of signal 1. As maybe used herein, the term “compares unfavorably”, indicates that acomparison between two or more items, signals, etc., fails to providethe desired relationship.

As may also be used herein, the terms “processing module”, “processingcircuit”, “processor”, and/or “processing unit” may be a singleprocessing device or a plurality of processing devices. Such aprocessing device may be a microprocessor, micro-controller, digitalsignal processor, microcomputer, central processing unit, fieldprogrammable gate array, programmable logic device, state machine, logiccircuitry, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or any device thatmanipulates signals (analog and/or digital) based on hard coding of thecircuitry and/or operational instructions. The processing module,module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit may be, or furtherinclude, memory and/or an integrated memory element, which may be asingle memory device, a plurality of memory devices, and/or embeddedcircuitry of another processing module, module, processing circuit,and/or processing unit. Such a memory device may be a read-only memory,random access memory, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, staticmemory, dynamic memory, flash memory, cache memory, and/or any devicethat stores digital information. Note that if the processing module,module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit includes more thanone processing device, the processing devices may be centrally located(e.g., directly coupled together via a wired and/or wireless busstructure) or may be distributedly located (e.g., cloud computing viaindirect coupling via a local area network and/or a wide area network).Further note that if the processing module, module, processing circuit,and/or processing unit implements one or more of its functions via astate machine, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or logiccircuitry, the memory and/or memory element storing the correspondingoperational instructions may be embedded within, or external to, thecircuitry comprising the state machine, analog circuitry, digitalcircuitry, and/or logic circuitry. Still further note that, the memoryelement may store, and the processing module, module, processingcircuit, and/or processing unit executes, hard coded and/or operationalinstructions corresponding to at least some of the steps and/orfunctions illustrated in one or more of the Figures. Such a memorydevice or memory element can be included in an article of manufacture.

One or more embodiments have been described above with the aid of methodsteps illustrating the performance of specified functions andrelationships thereof. The boundaries and sequence of these functionalbuilding blocks and method steps have been arbitrarily defined hereinfor convenience of description. Alternate boundaries and sequences canbe defined so long as the specified functions and relationships areappropriately performed. Any such alternate boundaries or sequences arethus within the scope and spirit of the claims. Further, the boundariesof these functional building blocks have been arbitrarily defined forconvenience of description. Alternate boundaries could be defined aslong as the certain significant functions are appropriately performed.Similarly, flow diagram blocks may also have been arbitrarily definedherein to illustrate certain significant functionality.

To the extent used, the flow diagram block boundaries and sequence couldhave been defined otherwise and still perform the certain significantfunctionality. Such alternate definitions of both functional buildingblocks and flow diagram blocks and sequences are thus within the scopeand spirit of the claims. One of average skill in the art will alsorecognize that the functional building blocks, and other illustrativeblocks, modules and components herein, can be implemented as illustratedor by discrete components, application specific integrated circuits,processors executing appropriate software and the like or anycombination thereof.

In addition, a flow diagram may include a “start” and/or “continue”indication. The “start” and “continue” indications reflect that thesteps presented can optionally be incorporated in or otherwise used inconjunction with other routines. In this context, “start” indicates thebeginning of the first step presented and may be preceded by otheractivities not specifically shown. Further, the “continue” indicationreflects that the steps presented may be performed multiple times and/ormay be succeeded by other activities not specifically shown. Further,while a flow diagram indicates a particular ordering of steps, otherorderings are likewise possible provided that the principles ofcausality are maintained.

The one or more embodiments are used herein to illustrate one or moreaspects, one or more features, one or more concepts, and/or one or moreexamples. A physical embodiment of an apparatus, an article ofmanufacture, a machine, and/or of a process may include one or more ofthe aspects, features, concepts, examples, etc. described with referenceto one or more of the embodiments discussed herein. Further, from figureto figure, the embodiments may incorporate the same or similarly namedfunctions, steps, modules, etc. that may use the same or differentreference numbers and, as such, the functions, steps, modules, etc. maybe the same or similar functions, steps, modules, etc. or differentones.

Unless specifically stated to the contra, signals to, from, and/orbetween elements in a figure of any of the figures presented herein maybe analog or digital, continuous time or discrete time, and single-endedor differential. For instance, if a signal path is shown as asingle-ended path, it also represents a differential signal path.Similarly, if a signal path is shown as a differential path, it alsorepresents a single-ended signal path. While one or more particulararchitectures are described herein, other architectures can likewise beimplemented that use one or more data buses not expressly shown, directconnectivity between elements, and/or indirect coupling between otherelements as recognized by one of average skill in the art.

The term “module” is used in the description of one or more of theembodiments. A module implements one or more functions via a device suchas a processor or other processing device or other hardware that mayinclude or operate in association with a memory that stores operationalinstructions. A module may operate independently and/or in conjunctionwith software and/or firmware. As also used herein, a module may containone or more sub-modules, each of which may be one or more modules.

As may further be used herein, a computer readable memory includes oneor more memory elements. A memory element may be a separate memorydevice, multiple memory devices, or a set of memory locations within amemory device. Such a memory device may be a read-only memory, randomaccess memory, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, static memory,dynamic memory, flash memory, cache memory, and/or any device thatstores digital information. The memory device may be in a form a solidstate memory, a hard drive memory, cloud memory, thumb drive, servermemory, computing device memory, and/or other physical medium forstoring digital information.

While particular combinations of various functions and features of theone or more embodiments have been expressly described herein, othercombinations of these features and functions are likewise possible. Thepresent disclosure is not limited by the particular examples disclosedherein and expressly incorporates these other combinations.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprises: authenticating, by acomputing device of a storage network, a first connection between one ormore storage units of a set of storage units of the storage network andat least one of the computing device and a first user computing deviceof the storage network; determining, by the computing device, to add asecond connection between the one or more storage units and at least oneof the computing device and a second user computing device of thestorage network; generating, by the computing device, a secret code;sending, by the computing device, the secret code to the one or morestorage units via the first connection; sending, by the one or morestorage units, responses to the secret code to the computing device viathe second connection; and authenticating, by the computing device, thesecond connection based on the authentication of the first connectionand the responses from the one or more storage units.
 2. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the authenticating the first connection comprises:authenticating a first part of the first connection between the firstuser computing device and the computing device by: obtaining, by thecomputing device, a public key associated with the first user computingdevice; encrypting, by the computing device, a message using the publickey, wherein the message is regarding establishing the first part of thefirst connection between the first user computing device and thecomputing device; sending, by the computing device, the encryptedmessage to the first user computing device; decrypting, by the firstuser computing device, the encrypted message using a private key;sending, by the first user computing device, a response to the messageto the computing device; and authenticating, by the computing device,the first part of the first connection between the first user computingdevice and the computing device when the response to the messageincludes an anticipated message reply.
 3. The method of claim 1, whereinthe authenticating the first connection comprises: authenticating asecond part of the first connection between the one or more storageunits and the computing device by: obtaining, by the computing device,one or more public keys associated with the one or more storage units,wherein each public key of the one or more public keys is associatedwith a particular storage unit of the one or more storage units;encrypting, by the computing device, each of one or more messages usinga particular public key of the one or more public keys, wherein each ofthe one or more messages is regarding establishing the second part ofthe first connection between the particular storage unit of the one ormore storage units and the computing device; sending, by the computingdevice, each of the one or more encrypted messages to each correspondingstorage unit of the one or more storage units; decrypting, by eachstorage unit of the one or more storage units, a corresponding encryptedmessage of the one or more encrypted messages using a correspondingprivate key; sending, by the one or more storage units, one or moreresponses to the computing device; and authenticating, by the computingdevice, the second part of the first connection between the one or morestorage units and the computing device when each response of the one ormore responses includes an anticipated message reply.
 4. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the responses to the secret code comprises one or moreof: the secret code; and information used to establish the secret code.5. The method of claim 1, wherein the authenticating the secondconnection further comprises: interpreting, by the computing device, theresponses from the one or more storage units to determine whether theresponses include an anticipated secret code reply; and when theresponses include the anticipated secret code reply, relying, by thecomputing device, on the authentication of the first connection toauthenticate the second connection between the computing device and theone or more storage units.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein theauthenticating the second connection comprises: authenticating a firstpart of the second connection between the second user computing deviceand the computing device by: obtaining, by the computing device, apublic key associated with the second user computing device; encrypting,by the computing device, a message using the public key, wherein themessage is regarding establishing the first part of the secondconnection between the second user computing device and the computingdevice; sending, by the computing device, the encrypted message to thesecond user computing device; decrypting, by the second user computingdevice, the encrypted message using a private key; sending, by thesecond user computing device, a response to the message to the computingdevice; and authenticating, by the computing device, the first part ofthe second connection between the second user computing device and thecomputing device when the response to the message includes ananticipated message reply.
 7. The method of claim 1 further comprises:determining, by the computing device, to add a third connection betweenthe one or more storage units and at least one of the computing deviceand a third user computing device; generating, by the computing device,a second secret code; sending, by the computing device, the secondsecret code to the one or more storage units via the first connection orthe second connection; sending, by the one or more storage units,responses to the second secret code to the computing device via thethird connection; and authenticating, by the computing device, the thirdconnection based on the authentication of the first connection or thesecond connection and the responses to the second secret code from theone or more storage units.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the one orone or more storage units includes at least a threshold number ofstorage units, wherein the threshold number is one of a read thresholdnumber, a write threshold number, a decode threshold number, and apillar width threshold number.
 9. A computer readable memory comprises:a first memory that stores operational instructions that, when executedby a computing device of a dispersed storage network, causes thecomputing device to: authenticate a first connection between one or morestorage units of a set of storage units of the storage network and atleast one of the computing device and a first user computing device ofthe storage network; determine to add a second connection between theone or more storage units and at least one of the computing device and asecond user computing device of the storage network; generate a secretcode; and send the secret code to the one or more storage units via thefirst connection; a second memory that stores operational instructionsthat, when executed by the one or more storage units, causes the one ormore storage units to: send responses to the secret code to thecomputing device via the second connection; and a third memory thatstores operational instructions that, when executed by the computingdevice, causes the computing device to: authenticate the secondconnection based on the authentication of the first connection and theresponses from the one or more storage units.
 10. The computer readablememory of claim 9, wherein the first memory further stores operationalinstructions that, when executed by the computing device, causes thecomputing device to authenticate the first connection by authenticatinga first part of the first connection between the first user computingdevice and the computing device by: obtaining a public key associatedwith the first user computing device; encrypting a message using thepublic key, wherein the message is regarding establishing the first partof the first connection between the first user computing device and thecomputing device; sending the encrypted message to the first usercomputing device; receiving a response to the message from the firstuser computing device, wherein the first user computing device decryptedthe encrypted message using a private key; and authenticating the firstpart of the first connection between the first user computing device andthe computing device when the response to the message includes ananticipated message reply.
 11. The computer readable memory of claim 9,wherein the first memory further stores operational instructions that,when executed by the computing device, causes the computing device toauthenticate the first connection by authenticating a second part of thefirst connection between the one or more storage units and the computingdevice by: obtaining one or more public keys associated with the one ormore storage units, wherein each public key of the one or more publickeys is associated with a particular storage unit of the one or morestorage units; encrypting each of one or more messages using aparticular public key of the one or more public keys, wherein each ofthe one or more messages is regarding establishing the second part ofthe first connection between the particular storage unit of the one ormore storage units and the computing device; sending each of the one ormore encrypted messages to each corresponding storage unit of the one ormore storage units; receiving one or more responses to the one or moremessages from the one or more storage units, wherein each storage unitof the one or more storage units decrypted a corresponding encryptedmessage of the one or more encrypted messages with a correspondingprivate key; and authenticating the second part of the first connectionbetween the one or more storage units and the computing device when eachresponse of the one or more responses includes an anticipated messagereply.
 12. The computer readable memory of claim 9, wherein theresponses to the secret code comprises one or more of: the secret code;and information used to establish the secret code.
 13. The computerreadable memory of claim 9, wherein the third memory further storesoperational instructions that, when executed by the computing device,causes the computing device to authenticate the second connection by:interpreting the responses from the one or more storage units todetermine whether the responses include an anticipated secret codereply; and when the responses include the anticipated secret code reply,relying on the authentication of the first connection to authenticatethe second connection between the computing device and the one or morestorage units.
 14. The computer readable memory of claim 9, wherein thethird memory further stores operational instructions that, when executedby the computing device, causes the computing device to authenticate thesecond connection by authenticating a first part of the secondconnection between the second user computing device and the computingdevice by: obtaining a public key associated with the second usercomputing device; encrypting a message using the public key, wherein themessage is regarding establishing the first part of the secondconnection between the second user computing device and the computingdevice; sending the encrypted message to the second user computingdevice; receiving a response to the message from the second usercomputing device, wherein the second user computing device decrypted theencrypted message using a private key; and authenticating the first partof the second connection between the second user computing device andthe computing device when the response to the message includes ananticipated message reply.
 15. The computer readable memory of claim 9,wherein the first memory that stores operational instructions that, whenexecuted by the computing device, causes the computing device to:determine to add a third connection between the one or more storageunits and at least one of the computing device and a third usercomputing device; generate a second secret code; send the second secretcode to the one or more storage units via the first connection or thesecond connection; receive responses to the second secret code from theone or more storage units via the third connection; and authenticate thethird connection based on the authentication of the first connection orthe second connection and the responses to the second secret code fromthe one or more storage units.
 16. The computer readable memory of claim9, wherein the one or one or more storage units includes at least athreshold number of storage units, wherein the threshold number is oneof a read threshold number, a write threshold number, a decode thresholdnumber, and a pillar width threshold number.